Posted under Foreign affairs & Interventionism & Terrorism
Here is a CATO article by Julian Sanchez on the al-Awlaki killing which we have already beaten to death. I link to it here because it has a very perceptive discussion on the issue of blowback.
First, over the last decade we have been repeatedly told by foreign policy hawks that it is foolish, and even borderline offensive, to suggest that aggressive U.S. action abroad may have the counterproductive and unintended consequence of swelling the ranks of terror groups. When evaluating the wisdom of drone strikes or invasions of other countries, we need not even factor in the downside risk of “blowback” stemming from such actions, because “they hate us for our freedoms.” In other words, radical Islamist terrorists are fundamentally motivated by a vision of a global caliphate, not by any grievances stemming from real or perceived injuries inflicted by U.S. policy. I think of this as the “No Marginal Terrorist” Theory, because it posits that people are motivated to join terror groups strictly for reasons connected with either personal psychology or theology, such that reactions to specific U.S. actions never make the difference at the margin.
At the same time—and often by the same people—we are told that Anwar al-Awlaki posed a grave threat to the United States, not so much because of any particular logistical genius he possessed, but because he was so dangerously effective as a recruiter and propagandist who could inspire people already living in the West to jihad. Surely, then, it’s relevant to inquire into the nature of this lethally effective propaganda. Here is an excerpt from what The Guardian calls one of ”his most direct, English-language statements endorsing terror attacks on Americans”:
With the American invasion of Iraq and continued U.S. aggression against Muslims, I could not reconcile between living in the U.S. and being a Muslim, and I eventually came to the conclusion that jihad against America is binding upon myself just as it is binding on every other Muslim….
To the Muslims in America, I have this to say: How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters?
Possibly al-Awlaki is just a sort of Salafist James Earl Jones, and the sheer hypnotic beauty of his voice is what compels people to sacrifice their lives for him, without regard to the specific contents of his sermons. Still, it seems to be a problem for the No Marginal Terrorist Theory if a propagandist who was believed to be uniquely effective at motivating people to become terrorists used rhetoric like this to do it.
The “No Marginal Terrorist Theory.” I like that. 
I would just add that the interventionist hysterics do not just suggest that discussing blowback is “borderline offensive.” Many suggest it is evidence of America hating at best and treason (a capital offense) at worst.
RonL on 07 Oct 2011 at 4:49 am #
If Muslim loyalty is to the Ummah to the degree that a defensive war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and the arguable liberation of Iraqi Muslims is a reason for them to take up arms against us, then isn’t the issue this loyalty and not our policy? And would not it make more sense to stop all their immigration and to expell all non-citizens, rather than accommodate our policies to their terror unde rthe guise of not causeing blowback? Because if we are going to play shrink, then let’s look at 1400 years of Islamic history, and note that surrender or the jizya leads to greater incursions, not peace and that this dynamic comes from the examples of the brigand rapist Mohammed.
“Third, the case for targeted killing here relies very heavily on the fact that al-Awlaki had put himself beyond the reach of feasible arrest. The most ardent hawk would recoil at the prospect of simply dropping a bomb on a citizen suspected of al Qaeda ties in New Jersey, or London. But as Robert Farley notes, what is “feasible” is at least in part a matter of judgments about the risks and benefits of attempting a capture. So we’re required to entrust to the executive branch to determine not just when a particular citizen has joined the enemy, but under what conditions it’s worth the risk of attempting to take them alive.”
So Sanchez wanted us to invade Yemen to get Al-Awlaki? If not, is sounds awfully like he thinks that American’s at war with America should be invulnerable to attack.
As to the issue of Sanchez’s point that too much is done, secretly, I agree 100%. Congress should legislate a method of dealing with ersatz and even real Americans conducting war against America oversees.
RedPhillips on 07 Oct 2011 at 7:00 pm #
Ron, I answered most of the second part of your question in the Paul Craig Roberts thread. A repost it below. I’m probably not as far from you on this as you think.
“Matt, I conceded that declaring war on Al-Qaeda would be messy and breaking new ground, but I don’t see an alternative. I used to agree with Ron Paul that we should have issued letters of marque and reprisal to authorize targeted actions against OBL and AQ, but on further study I don’t think that LOMAR are really germane. (Historian Kevin Gutzman in a private conversation on Facebook agreed with me on this.) Historically, a LOMAR was given to authorize private citizens and vessels to carry out acts on behalf of the government with government sanction, usually on the high seas and usually regarding piracy. Unless we are going to authorize mercenaries to hunt down OBL on our behalf, LOMAR are not really germane. What we should have done is authorize our regular military to carry out targeted strikes that are likely going to involve compromising the sovereignty of some foreign country. How do you do that? I don’t know? It isn’t really covered under a declaration of war or LOMAR. Perhaps Congress could authorize some use of force less than a formal declaration of war but that is very problematic as that is what we have been doing since after WWII and you can see how well that has worked. If we were going to do so the declaration would need to be very specific and authorize a specific legal framework to work under.
I agree with you that “slippery slope” reasoning can paralyze rational policy. Just as thinking that the Bell Curve is sound science does not mean you are about to march people off to concentration camps, so too killing a citizen in a foreign country who is a suspected terrorist during a quasi, ill defined state of war does not mean Obama is about to start bombing cranky Tea Partiers. (I agree with PCR that Congress should have at least stripped him of his citizenship first.)
I also agree that the targeted killing of enemies such as this could actually decrease the need for larger engagements down the line. What would be the risk benefit ratio of a targeted killing vs. sending in a larger force to capture him for trial especially if Yemen isn’t on board? When I argue that terrorism is more of an intel issue than a military issue, I assume that that intel is going to lead to some targeted actions (shall we say) short of invasion and occupation. The problem I have with the killing of Al-Awlaki is that there doesn’t seem to be a legal framework, and what legal framework there is is allegedly secret. This is highly troubling. Why would legal reasoning ever need to be secret?”
RedPhillips on 07 Oct 2011 at 7:04 pm #
“And would not it make more sense to stop all their immigration and to expell all non-citizens”
Of course I agree with this.
“rather than accommodate our policies to their terror under the guise of not causing blowback?”
But I think our policies are wrongheaded to begin with. Of course we disagree about that, but what I ask is that interventionists acknowledge the reality of blowback and admit that they believe we should continue our current policy IN SPITE OF BLOWBACK, and stop the feigned indignation.